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Abstract
The budget is the key means for effecting policy
in democracies, yet its preparation is typically an
excluding, opaque, and arcane process. We aim to
rectify this by providing for the democratic creation of
complete budgets — for cooperatives, cities, or states.
Such budgets are typically (i) prepared, discussed,
and voted upon by comparing and contrasting with
last-year’s budget; (ii) quantitative, in that items appear
in quantities with potentially varying costs; and (iii)
hierarchical, reflecting the organization’s structure.
Our process can be used by a budget committee, the
legislature or the electorate at large.
We allow great flexibility in vote elicitation, from
perturbing last-year’s budget to a complete ranked
budget proposal. We present a polynomial-time
algorithm which takes such votes, last-year’s
budget, and a budget limit as input and produces
a budget that is provably “democratically optimal”
(Condorcet-consistent), in that no proposed change to it
has majority support among the votes.
1. Introduction
Even in the best democracies the budgeting process
is somewhat of a mystery. Various people and bodies are
involved, officially and unofficially, in the limelight and
behind the scenes. Arguments are made, pressures are
mounted, and at the end of the process a budget proposal
is placed in front of the governing body for approval.
While the governing body may question the proposed
budget and request amendments, there is presently no
feasible method for turning the individual preferences
of the members of the governing body into a budget that
faithfully reflects their joint democratic will. Here we
provide such a method, which can be used by a budget
committee, the parliament, or the citizens at large.
Participatory budgeting (PB) [1] offers ways for a
society to participate in constructing a budget. Initiated
by Brazil workers’ party [2], various societies have
adopted similar ideas [3], where usually only a small
fraction of a municipality’s annual budget is decided
directly by the residents. After a deliberative phase,
participants vote on projects such as schools, bike roads,
etc., usually by some variants of k-Approval [4], where
each resident specifies k projects of highest priority
(other elicitation methods are mentioned below).
Current methods of participatory budgeting may be
limited not only in their application, but also in their
foundations: (1) While the previous budget is typically
the starting point of practical budgeting processes,
current methods ignore it; (2) The elicitation methods
are usually limited to approvals or simple pairwise
comparisons; (3) The methods typically cannot handle
budgeting of quantitative items (e.g., how many new
school buses to buy?) with all their complexities (e.g.,
decreasing marginal costs); and (4) Current methods
cannot deal with hierarchical budgeting.
Here we aim to address these issues. As our method
supports the democratic conduct of budget committees
and parliaments, we term our approach democratic
budgeting. We consider one of the foundations of
social choice, namely the Condorcet principle, and
generalize it to our setting: In single winner elections,
the Condorcet approach involves selecting a winner
which dominates all others by a voter majority; a natural
way to generalize it to budgets is to select a budget
(i.e., a subset of the proposed items, the cost of which
is within the budget limit) which dominates all other
budgets.
We describe a polynomial-time budgeting algorithm
that computes a Condorcet-winning budget, whenever
such a budget exists; if no such budget exists, it
finds a member of the Smith set, defined below. We
first prove the correctness of our algorithm on a
simple model, which is close to the standard model of
participatory budgeting (voters specify rankings, items
are not quantitative), but takes the previous budget into
consideration; then, we enhance our model as discussed
above and describe how our algorithm generalizes
naturally and remains computationally efficient.
Our democratic budgeting scenario is natural and
captures more situations than the usual model; it is
powerful and allows voters to specify both very simple
preferences (e.g., approvals) and very complex ones
(e.g., partial orders); budgets computed by our algorithm
satisfy the voters’ wishes, and cannot be argued against.
Our method allows for the construction of hierarchical
budgets, and thus can be applied to situations where
a “high-level” budget (say, a city budget) consists of
several “low-level” budgets (say, one for education,
another for transportation, etc.).
1.1. Related Work
Our model differs from existing models of PB:
(1) We directly incorporate last year’s budget, in
accordance with Reality-aware Social Choice [5]; (2)
We employ a powerful and flexible elicitation method,
accommodating partial orders (contrasted to Approval
voting [1, 6], Knapsack voting [7], Value voting,
Value-for-money voting, and Threshold voting [8]); (3)
We allow quantifiable and indivisible items of various
costs, allowing to express, e.g., decreasing marginal
costs of budgeting certain amounts of the same item; and
(4) We provide for hierarchical budget construction.
Within computational social choice [9], multiwinner
elections [10] are receiving increased attention. We
generalize multiwinner elections as (1) We allow partial
orders (compare to, e.g., [11]; see also, e.g., [12])
and (2) We allow different costs (compare to, e.g.,
[10]; see also, e.g., [13]). Our generalization of the
Condorcet criterion generalizes that of Fishburn [14, 15]
(studied further in [16] and [17]; different, element-wise
concepts exist [18, 19]). We concentrate on the more
abstract minmax set extension [20, 21]; other set
extensions are studied [16, 21]).
Our efficient algorithm iteratively uses Schwartz’s
tournament solution. In this we mention the work of
Bouysso [22] which study such algorithms abstractly.
2. Preliminaries
We provide preliminaries regarding rankings and
tournaments. For an integer n ∈ N, we denote the set
{1, . . . , n} by [n]. Given a set A, a partial order ≻ on
A is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation.
A ranking is a total order. A weak ranking is a total
order with ties, and corresponds to an ordered partition:
Given a set A, an ordered partition ≻ is a partition of
A into linearly ordered and disjoint sets, referred to
as components, whose union is A. E.g., given A =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, the ordered partition {2} ≻ {3, 4} ≻
{1, 5}, whose first, second, and third components are,
correspondingly, {2}, {3, 4}, and {1, 5} defines a weak
order where, e.g., 2 is preferred to 4 while 3 and 4
tie. We interchange ordered partitions, weak orders,
and weak rankings. A tournament is a directed graph.
A tournament solution is a function f which takes a
tournament as an input and selects a nonempty subset
of its vertices as output; i.e., f : T (A)→ 2A \ ∅, where
T (A) is the set of all tournaments over A. We use the
following two tournament solutions.
Definition 1. A Schwartz component of a tournament
T = (A,E) is a minimal set X ⊆ A of vertices of T
such that for any b ∈ A \X there is no a ∈ X such that
(b, a) ∈ E. The Schwartz set is the union of all Schwartz
components.
Definition 2. The Smith set of a tournament T =
(A,E) is the minimal set X ⊆ A of vertices of T such
that for each a ∈ X and each b /∈ X , (a, b) ∈ E holds.
3. The Basic Model
We describe the basic model, where voters express
preferences over distinct items, and, given the previous
budget, we shall select a subset of these items whose
total cost respects the predefined budget limit. Formally,
a budget proposal P is a set of distinct budget items,
where the cost of a budget item b ∈ P is denoted by
cost(b). A vote profile V is a set of votes, where each
vote v ∈ V is a linear order of the budget proposal P ,
which specifies the preferences of the voter. A budget B
is a subset of the budget proposal P (sometimes called
bundle in the literature). Given a budget limit ℓ, a budget
B is feasible if its cost is within the budget limit, i.e., if∑
b∈B cost(b) ≤ ℓ. Members of B are budgeted items
while members ofP\B are unbudgeted items. A budget
B is exhaustive if it is feasible and for no item b ∈ P\B,
the budget B ∪ {b} is feasible.
A budgeting algorithm gets as input the tuple
(P ,V , ℓ, B′), where P is a budget proposal, V is a
vote profile, ℓ is a budget limit, and B−1 ⊆ P is the
previous (e.g., last year’s) budget. Given this input, a
budgeting algorithm computes a feasible budget B ⊆
P . A budgeting algorithm is exhaustive if it computes
only exhaustive budgets. We wish that the budget B
computed by a budgeting algorithm, in addition to being
feasible and exhaustive, will also reflect the preferences
of the votes of the vote profile V , and we will use the
previous budget B−1 as a guiding compass.
Example 1. Consider the following simple budgeting
scenario. The budget proposal P contains the items: a,
b, and c. The cost of a is 1, the cost of b is 2, and the cost
of c is 4. The vote profile V contains the votes: v1 : a ≻
b ≻ c and v2 : c ≻ a ≻ b. The budget limit is ℓ = 3.
Then, {a}, {b}, and {a, b} are all feasible, while {a, b}
is the only exhaustive budget. An exhaustive budgeting
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algorithm, given the tuple (P ,V , ℓ, B′), where B−1 =
{a} is the previous budget, shall output the budget B =
{a, b}.
3.1. Condorcet-winning Budgets
We are interested in applying the Condorcet
principle to budgets. In single-winner elections, the
Condorcet principle states that if there is a candidate c
such that, for each other candidate c′ 6= c, more voters
prefer c to c′, then c shall be chosen.
To apply the Condorcet principle to budgets, a notion
of voter preference among budgets shall be derived
from voter preference among budget items. Fishburn et
al. [14, 15] generalized the notion of Condorcet winner
to multiwinner elections (where the aim is to select a
set of unit-cost items); we further generalize it to sets
of items of arbitrary costs. To achieve that, we apply
the minmax set extension [20] to our budgeting setting:
Intuitively, a voter prefers one budget over another if it
ranks higher all the items budgeted by the first budget
but not the second, compared to all items budgeted by
the second budget but not by the first.
Definition 3 (Position). Let v : b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ b|P|
be a vote over a proposal P . We define posv(B), the
positions of a budget B ⊆ P in v, to be posv(B) = {i :
bi ∈ B}.
E.g., for v : b1 ≻ b2 ≻ b3, posv({b1, b3}) = {1, 3}.
Definition 4 (Prefers). Let v : b1 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ b|P| be
a vote over a proposal P . Let B ⊆ P and B′ ⊆ P be
two budgets. Then, v prefersB overB′ ifmax(posv(B\
B′)) < min(posv(B
′\B)), wheremax(∅) = min(∅) =
∞.
Example 2. Let P = {b1, b2, b3, b4} be a proposal,
where each item costs 1 and let v : b1 ≻ b2 ≻ b3 ≻ b4
be a vote. Let B = {b1, b2, b3} andB′ = {b1, b2, b4} be
two budgets. Then, posv(B \ B
′) = posv({b3}) = {3}
while posv(B
′ \ B) = posv({b4}) = {4}, thus, 3 =
max(posv(B \B
′)) < min(posv(B
′ \B)) = 4, and so
v prefers B over B′.
Our definition is conservative as it may refrain from
judging one budget as preferable to another even in cases
when one might be intuitively inclined to make such a
judgment. We find that it offers a good balance in being
restrictive, and thus making only solid judgments, but
powerful enough to provide a practical foundation for
the following definitions and algorithm. Other options to
define voter preference are discussed in Section 7. Next
we describe what it means for one budget to dominate
another. Note that we use strict rather than relative
majority in defining this notion.
Definition 5 (Dominance). Let V be a profile and B
and B′ budgets over a proposal P . We say that (1)
B dominates B′ if the number of votes preferring B
over B′ is larger than 12 |V |; (2) B weakly dominates
B′, denoted by B ⊲ B′, if B is not dominated by B′.
The weak dominance relation⊲ is reflexive (B ⊲ B
for all B) and total (B ⊲ B′ or B′ ⊲ B or both for all
B and B′) but not transitive (see Example 3).
Definition 6 (Condorcet-winning budget). Given a vote
profile V over a budget proposal P and a budget limit ℓ,
a feasible budgetB of P is a Condorcet-winning budget
if B dominates all other feasible budgets.
A Condorcet-winning budget cannot be argued
against, as there is no majority to support any change
to it. Condorcet-winning budgets are also exhaustive.
Such budgets, however, do not always exist.
Example 3. Consider the budget proposal P =
{b1, b2, b3}, where the cost of each item is 1, and the
following vote profile over it: v1 : b1 ≻ b2 ≻ b3,
v2 : b2 ≻ b3 ≻ b1, v3 : b3 ≻ b1 ≻ b2. Following the
symmetry of the profile, we can assume, without loss of
generality, that for the budget limit ℓ = 1, any budget B
which is within limit ℓ equals to one of the following two
options: B0 = ∅; or B1 = {b1}. Further, budget B0
is not exhaustive, since, e.g., b1 can fit within limit, and
hence not a Condorcet winner (as Condorcet-winning
budgets are exhaustive). Regarding budget B1, both v2
and v3 prefer the budget B3 = {b3} over B1 = {b1}
and hence B1 is not a Condorcet winner.
3.2. An Efficient Condorcet-consistent
Budgeting Algorithm
A Condorcet-consistent budgeting algorithm is a
budgeting algorithm that returns a Condorcet-winning
budget whenever such exists. Consider the following
naive algorithm: First, it creates a directed graph,
referred to as the budgets graph, which contains a vertex
for each feasible budget and an arc from vertex B
to vertex B′ if B dominates B′. Given this budgets
graph, the algorithm returns the budget corresponding
to a vertex with outgoing arcs to all other budgets, if
such a vertex exists. Indeed, this budgeting algorithm is
Condorcet-consistent. As there are exponentially-many
feasible budgets, the naive algorithm described above
runs in exponential time.
We describe a polynomial-time Smith-consistent
budgeting algorithm (SBA): It always returns a budget
from the Smith set of the budgets graph (see
Preliminaries, Section 2). If a Condorcet-winning
budget exists, then the Smith set is its singleton, thus our
algorithm is also Condorcet-consistent. A pseudo-code
of SBA is in Algorithm 1 (notice that we use the
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Algorithm 1 Smith-consistent budgeting (SBA)
1: procedure RANKING
2: input: a budget proposal P
3: input: a vote profile V
4: V ← ∅
5: while G 6= ∅ do
6: S ← Schwartz-set(G)
7: V ← V ≻ S; G← G \ S
8: return V
9:
10: procedure PRUNING
11: input: a budget proposal P
12: input: an ordered partition V : C1 ≻ . . . ≻ Cz
13: input: a budget limit ℓ
14: input: the previous budget B−1
15: B ← ∅;
16: for i ∈ [z] do
17: Bi ← a maximal subset ofCi closest toB−1
with cost(B ∪Bi) ≤ ℓ
18: B ← B ∪Bi
19: returnB
20:
21: procedure SBA
22: input: a budget proposal P
23: input: a vote profile V
24: input: a budget limit ℓ
25: input: the previous budget B−1
26: V ← RANKING(P ,V)
27: B ← PRUNING(P , V, ℓ, B−1)
28: returnB
previous budget B−1; we defer a discussion on it to
Section 3.4). it is composed of these procedures: A
Ranking procedure which, given a vote profile V over
a budget proposal P , aggregates the votes in V into
an ordered partition and outputs it; and a Pruning
procedure which, given an ordered partition and a
budget limit, outputs a feasible budget.
The following notions play a key role in the
description of the algorithm and its proof.
Definition 7 (Majority graph, weak majority graph). Let
P be a budget proposal and ‘V be a vote profile. The
majority graph of P and V has a vertex for each item
b ∈ P and an arc between any two items b, b′ ∈ P if
more than half of the votes rank b′ higher than b.
Its corresponding weak majority graph has, in
addition, arcs (b, b′) and (b′, b) for every b, b′ ∈ P for
which the majority graph has neither arc.
The Ranking procedure first creates the majority
graph. Then, it iteratively construct the ordered
partition V , initiated to be empty. In each iteration,
it identifies the Schwartz set (see Section 2), adds its
vertices as the next component of V and removes them
from the majority graph. When no vertices remain in
the majority graph it halts, at which point V is indeed an
ordered partition of P .
The Pruning procedure, given the ordered partition
V : C1 ≻ C2 ≻ . . . ≻ Cz computed by the ranking
procedure, gradually populates the set of budgeted items
B. It iterates over the components of V , where the ith
iteration considers the ith component Ci. It chooses a
maximal subset Bi of Ci such that the cost of B ∪ Bi
remains within limit; if several such subsets exist, it
chooses one which is the closest to the previous budget
B−1, where closeness between two budgets is measured
by the total cost of the symmetric difference between
them. In particular, observe that if cost(B ∪ Ci) ≤ ℓ
then Bi = Ci. If this is not the case, then some items of
Ci will remain unbudgeted, but budgeting any of them
would cause B to go over the limit. After considering
all components of V , it outputs the budget B.
3.3. SBA is Condorcet-consistent
Here we prove that SBA is Smith-consistent, and
thus in particular Condorcet-consistent (see Section 2).
We refer to a budget as a Smith budget if it is in the Smith
set and show that our algorithm computes only Smith
budgets. To do so we introduce the following notions.
Definition 8 (Weak domination path). There is a weak
domination path (path for short) in the budgets graph,
from a budget B to a budget B′, denoted by B ⊲⊲⊲
B′, if there is a sequence of budgets (B1, B2, . . . , Bk),
k ≥ 2, such thatB = B1, Bk = B′, andBi ⊲ Bi+1 for
each i ∈ [k − 1].
Consider a budget B′ which is not in the Smith set
and another budget B which is in the Smith set. By
definition, B′ is dominated by B, and thus B′ does not
weakly dominate B. Further, there is no path from B′
to B, since B′ does not dominate any budget in the
Smith set, and this also holds for all other budgets which
are, like B′, not in the Smith set. We conclude, by
considering the counterpositive, that in order to prove
that SBA is Smith-consistent, it is sufficient to show that
any budget it computes has paths to all other budgets.
Corollary 1. Given a vote profile V over a budget
proposal P and a budget limit ℓ, a budget B is a Smith
budget if and only if B ⊲⊲⊲ B′ holds for any feasible
budget B′ of P .
A path in a directed graph is a sequence of arcs,
where the second vertex of an arc in the path is the first
vertex of the next arc in the path. It will be useful to
consider paths in the weak majority graph, referred to as
weak majority paths. We denote the existence of a weak
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majority path from one item b to another b′ by b ❀ b′.
The lemmas below relate the weak majority graph to
the budgets graph (recall that the former is polynomial
and has budget items as vertices, while the latter is
exponential and has feasible budgets as vertices).
Lemma 1 (Weak majority arc implies domination). Let
b and b′ be two vertices in the majority graph computed
by SBA for some profile V over some proposal P . Let
B = {b} and B′ = {b′}. If the arc (b, b′) is present in
the weak majority graph then B ⊲ B′.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that B does not
weakly dominate B′, so B′ dominates B. Let M be
a set of more than half of the voters where each voter
v ∈M prefersB′ to B. By definition, these voters rank
b′ higher than they rank b. Thus, the arc (b′, b) is present
in the majority graph, in contradiction to the assumption
that (b, b′) is in the weak majority graph.
Lemma 2 (Weak majority path implies domination
path). Let b and b′ be two vertices in the majority graph
computed by SBA for some vote profile V over some
budget proposal P . Let B = {b} and B′ = {b′}. If
b❀ b′ then B ⊲⊲⊲ B′.
Proof. Since b ❀ b′ it follows that there is a set of
vertices b1, . . . , bt such that b = b1, bt = b
′, and the arc
(bi, bi+1) is present in the weak majority graph for each
i ∈ [t− 1]. From Lemma 1 it follows that Bbi ⊲ Bbi+1
holds for each i ∈ [t − 1], where BBi = {bi} and
BBi+1 = {bi+1}. We conclude that B ⊲⊲⊲ B
′.
Lemma 3 (Crucial lemma). LetP be a budget proposal,
ℓ be a budget limit, B,B′ ⊆ P two feasible budgets,
and V be a vote profile over P . Then, if b❀ b′ for some
b ∈ B \B′ and b′ ∈ B′ \B, then B ⊲⊲⊲ B′.
Proof. Let b ∈ B \ B′ and b′ ∈ B′ \ B such that b ❀
b′. Let Bb = {b} and notice that Bb is feasible since
Bb ⊆ B and B is feasible. Further, B ⊲⊲⊲ Bb since
in particular B ⊲ Bb as Bb ⊆ B. In order to show
that B ⊲⊲⊲ B′ it remains to show that Bb ⊲⊲⊲ B
′.
Since b❀ b′ there is a set of vertices b1, . . . , bt such that
b = b1, bt = b
′, and (bi, bi+1) is in the weak majority
graph for each i ∈ [t− 1]. Notice that b = b1 /∈ B′ and
that b′ = bt ∈ B′. Let j (j ∈ [t − 1]) be the smallest
index for which bj /∈ B′ but bj+1 ∈ B′. (Indeed, it
might be that b′ = bj+1; this would happen if the weak
majority path from b to b′ does not go through any vertex
in B′.) Using Lemma 2 and since b ❀ bj it follows
that Bb ⊲⊲⊲ Bj where Bj = {bj}, thus it remains
to show that Bj ⊲ B
′. Using Lemma 1, and since the
arc (bj , bj+1) is in the weak majority graph, it follows
that Bj ⊲ Bj+1 where Bj+1 = {j + 1}. Thus, for
each set M of more than half of the voters there exists
at least one voter v ∈ M which ranks bj before it ranks
bj+1. Since bj /∈ B′ but bj+1 ∈ B′, it then follows that
min(posv(Bj \ B
′)) = min(posv(Bj)) = posv(Bj) <
posv(Bj+1) ≤ max(posv(B
′ \Bj)). As such a voter v
exists in every set M containing more than half of the
voters, it follows that Bj ⊲ B
′.
Theorem 1. SBA is Smith-consistent.
Proof. Consider the ordered partition V : C1 ≻ . . . ≻
Cz produced by the Ranking procedure (each Cj is a
maximum subset of the jth Schwartz set). Consider the
budget B produced by the Pruning procedure, based on
the ordered partitionV and letBi = B∩Ci, i ∈ [z]; note
that the Bi’s are exactly the maximal subsets selected
for budgeting by the Pruning procedure. Let B′ be a
feasible budget and let B′i = B
′ ∩Ci, i ∈ [z]. Below we
show that B ⊲⊲⊲ B′ which will finish the proof.
If B′ \ B = ∅ then B′ ⊆ B and thus B′ cannot
dominateB, thus we assume that B′ \B 6= ∅. Consider
the smallest index i (i ∈ [z]) for which B′i \ Bi 6= ∅
and consider some b′ ∈ B′i \ Bi. By construction, b
′ ∈
Ci \ Bi. Since Bi is a maximal subset of Ci such that
the budget (B ∩ {C1, . . . , Ci−1})∪Bi is feasible (refer
to Line 17 in Algorithm 1), it follows that (B \ B′) ∩
{C1, . . . , Ci} 6= ∅. Let b ∈ (B \B′)∩{C1, . . . , Ci}, let
Bb = {b}, and notice that Bb is a feasible budget since
Bb ⊆ B and B is feasible. Further, notice that B ⊲ Bb
since Bb ⊆ B. It remains to show that Bb ⊲⊲⊲ B′
which would finish the proof.
Recall that b′ ∈ Ci and consider the following
two cases. The cases differ in whether b is in the
same component Ci as b
′ (Second case) or in an earlier
component Cj , j < i (First case). In each case we
show that Bb ⊲⊲⊲ B
′ and thus conclude that indeed
B ⊲⊲⊲ B′ and thus SBA is Smith-consistent.
First case. If b ∈ Cj for some j < i, then the arc
(b′, b) cannot be in the majority graph, since Cj is a
Schwartz set in the majority graph not containing the
vertices inC1, . . . , Cj−1 but containing b
′. Thus, the arc
(b, b′) is present in the weakmajority graph, thus b❀ b′.
Applying Lemma 3 we conclude that Bb ⊲⊲⊲ B
′.
Second case. If b ∈ Ci, then b and b′ are in the
same Schwartz set Ci. If b and b
′ are in different
Schwartz components, then the arcs (b, b′) and (b′, b) are
not present in the majority graph, thus they are present
in the weak majority graph. In particular, b ❀ b′,
and by applying Lemma 3 we conclude that Bb ⊲⊲⊲
B′. Otherwise, if b and b′ are in the same Schwartz
component then b❀ b′ since each Schwartz component
is a cycle in the majority graph. Again, applying 3 we
conclude that Bb ⊲⊲⊲ B
′.
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SBA is efficient, as the majority graph has
linearly-many vertices and computing a Schwartz set
can be done in polynomial time (Schwartz components
correspond to strongly connected components; this is
folklore). Furthermore, choosing a maximal subset of a
Schwartz set which is the closest to the previous budget
can be done efficiently (e.g., greedily choosing items
budgeted by B−1).
Corollary 2. SBA is a polynomial-time Smith-consistent
budgeting algorithm.
3.4. Reality-aware Budgeting and Hysteresis
Notice how SBA uses the previous budget B−1 to
break ties when selecting a maximal subset of each
Schwartz set (in the pruning phase). This is a special
case of the Reality-aware voting rules considered in [5]
and is motivated, e.g., by Arrow’s claim that The
status quo does have a built-in edge over all alternative
proposals [23, Page 95]. More generally, considering
the previous budget is both natural and useful, as
budgeting scenarios fit very well in the framework
of Reality-aware Social Choice [5]: (1) Votes may
be provided as a simple amendment to the previous
budget, e.g., by adding/removing items or changing
their quantities (indeed, recall that we can incorporate
partial orders and also refer to the UI considerations
at Section 7); and (2) The distance of a new budget to
the previous budget can be computed, e.g., as the total
cost of the items in the symmetric difference between
the two (see the Distance-based Reality-aware Social
Choice model [5]).
Formally, the previous budget can be seen as
a dichotomous ordered partition of the budget
proposal, where the first indifference class contains
the previously-budgeted items and the second contains
those which are not. Then, the previous budget can be
used as follows: (1) Limit voters’ flexibility, requiring
them to submit preferences which are not too far from
the previous budget; (2) Orthogonally, limit the distance
of the new budget from the previous budget. This might
be a form of hysteresis (as discussed, e.g., in [24]),
limiting the rate of change of budgets year-to-year.
This perspective allows for the budget limit itself
to be decided upon democratically, e.g., by taking the
median of the proposed budget limits. This view of the
previous budget as an ordered partition motivates the
generalization described next.
4. Incorporating Partial Orders
In this section we adapt SBA to voters specifying
partial orders. This would be especially useful for
considering quantitative items (Section 5). The main
observation is that we shall only care for the definition
of when a voter prefers some budgetB over anotherB′.
For linear orders, we had Definition 4. Next we consider
ordered partitions. Ordered partitions (linear orders
with ties) are particularly interesting in the context of
budgets, as they can be understood as preference classes.
Example 4. Consider a budget proposal P =
{b1, b2, b3, b4, b5} and a vote v : {b1} ≻ {b2, b4} ≻
{b3, b5}. Such a vote can be understood as a voter
wishing to first budget b1; then, if possible, budget b2
and b4, and only if the budget is not exhausted yet,
budget b3 and b5.
The definition of when a voter prefers one budget
to another extends as is from linear orders (i.e.,
Definition 4) to ordered partitions. Notice that, in
particular, it means that a voter is indifferent to two
budgets having a nonempty symmetric difference in at
last one component of her ordered partition.
Example 5. Let v : {a, b, c} ≻ {d} be an ordered
partition over the budget proposal P = {a, b, c, d}.
Let the cost of all items be 1, and let B = {a, b} and
B′ = {a, c}. Then, posv(B\B
′) = posv(B
′\B) = {1},
thus v neither prefer B to B′ nor B′ to B.
It seems that ordered partitions provide enough
practical expressive power for voters (see Example 4).
Still, the following definition is a generalization, wrt. to
the minmax extension, for general partial orders.
Definition 9 (Prefers for partial orders). Let v be a
partial order over some budget proposal P . Then, v
prefers a budget B ⊆ P over a budget B′ ⊆ P if the
following hold: (1) For each item b′ ∈ B′ \ B there is
an item b ∈ B \B′ which comes before b′ in the partial
order; (2) For each item b ∈ B \ B′ there is no item
b′ ∈ B′ \B which comes before b in the partial order.
Importantly, the proof of Theorem 1 follows through
with this definition, by adapting Lemma 3 to account for
this adapted notion of preference among budgets.
5. Quantitative Budgets
We extend our model to deal with quantitative
budgets, and show that SBA remains efficient even when
quantities are given in binary encodings. To this end, we
adapt the definition of a budget proposal to account for
quantitative budgets.
Definition 10 (Quantitative representation of budget
proposals). In the quantitative representation of budget
proposals, a budget proposal is a set of tuples (bi, qi),
where qi is the quantity of the budget item bi. Each
budget item bi, having qi copies of it in the budget
proposal, is associated with a cost function, where
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Fbi(q), q ∈ [qi], is the cost of q copies of bi. The
definition of cost is generalized to budgets in a natural
way: The cost of a budget B containing qi copies of
budget item bi, i ∈ [z] is
∑
j∈[z] Fbi(qi).
Example 6. Consider a proposal containing 5
submarines, 3 boats, and 1 airplane. Each submarine
costs 7 million, but there is a discount of 4 million for
each 5 submarines; each boat costs 2 million; and an
airplane costs 10 million. Then, denoting submarines
by s, boats by b, and airplanes by a, the proposal is
P = {(s, 5), (b, 3), (a, 1)} with cost functions: For
submarines: Fs(1) = 7, Fs(2) = 14, Fs(3) = 21,
Fs(4) = 28, Fs(5) = 29; For boats: Fb(1) = 2,
Fb(2) = 4, Fb(3) = 6; For airplanes: Fa(1) =
10. A voter can then specify: “my first priority is 2
submarines; my second priority is 1 airplane and 3
boats; my last priority is another 3 submarines”; by
voting: v : {(s, 2)} ≻ {(a, 1), (b, 3)} ≻ {(s, 3)}.
Remark 1. A voter, specifying an ordered partition over
a quantitative budget proposal P = {(bi, qi) : i ∈ [z]},
can be represented as v : C1 ≻ C2 ≻ · · · ≻ Cq , where
each Cj contains several tuples of the form (bj, zbj ),
where zbj ≤ qbj ; the sum of those quantities sums to
qbj . E.g., in the vote considered in the example above,
v : {(s, 2)} ≻ {(a, 1), (b, 3)} ≻ {(s, 3)} corresponds
to v : C1 ≻ C2 ≻ C3; and there are, e.g., 5 submarines
in all of these components together.
5.1. Prefers with Quantities
To adapt SBA to quantitative budget proposals, first
we adapt Definition 4 to define when does a voter prefer
one budget over another. We introduce the concepts of
remainders and ranked difference. The remainder of a
budget with respect to a vote consists of all the items
ranked by a vote but not budgeted by the budget, keeping
their original ranking in the vote.
Definition 11 (Remainder). Let P be a quantitative
budget proposal, B a budget of P , and v : C1 ≻ C2 ≻
. . . ≻ Cz an ordered partition over P . The unbudgeted
remainder of B with respect to v is RemB(v) = C
′
1 ≻
C′2 ≻ . . . ≻ C
′
z , with components C
′
i, i ∈ [z], defined
via the following equations: B0 = B, and for each i,
i ∈ [z], C′i = Ci \Bi−1 and Bi = Bi−1 \ Ci.
Intuitively, the ith component of the remainder of
a budget B of P with respect to v contains exactly
the elements of the ith component of v which are
unbudgeted by B. Given a vote v and a budget B
over P , the union of the elements of RemB(v) equals
P \ B, which are all items unbudgeted by B. We use
remainders to compute the ranking of the elements in
the symmetric difference between two budgets.
Definition 12 (Ranked difference between budgets). Let
P be a quantitative budget proposal, v a ranking over
P , andB andB′ budgets over P . The ranked difference
between the unbudgeted remainders of the two budgets
with respect to v is DiffB,B′(v) = RemB′(v) \
RemB(v), where the set difference operator is applied
component-wise. We define IndB,B′(v) as the set of
indices of the components for which DiffB,B′(v) is
non-empty; that is, denoting DiffB,B′(v) as C1 ≻ . . . ≻
Cz , we define IndB,B′ = {i : Ci 6= ∅}.
That is, while RemB(v) collects and ranks items
unbudgeted by B according to their ranking by v,
DiffB,B′(v) collects and ranks items budgeted by B but
not by B′ according to their ranking, and each index in
IndB,B′(v) names a component of v that has at least one
item budgeted by B but not by B′.
Next, intuitively, a vote prefers one budget over
another if it ranks higher all the items budgeted by the
first budget but not the second, compared to all items
budgeted by the second budget but not by the first.
Definition 13 (Prefers for quantitative budgets). Let P
be a proposal, v a ranking over P , and B and B′
budgets over P . We say that v prefers B over B′ if it
holds thatmax(IndB,B′(v)) < min(IndB′,B(v)), where
we setmax(∅) = min(∅) =∞.
E.g., if B′ ⊂ B, then B is preferred over B′ (by any
vote v) since IndB′,B(v) = ∅ while IndB,B′(v) is not.
In addition, prefers is irreflexive since ∞ ≮ ∞. This
definition indeed generalizes the simple definition of the
basic model, described in Section 3. To illustrate the
notions defined above, consider the following example.
Example 7. Let P = {(a, 3), (b, 1)} be a quantitative
budget proposal, where the cost of each item is 1. Let
V = {v} be a profile, where v : {(a, 1)} ≻ {(a, 1)} ≻
{(b, 1)} ≻ {(a, 1)} (each occurrence of (a, 1) is a
different ‘a‘-item). Let B = {{(a, 2)}, {b, 1}} and
B′ = {{(a, 3)}} be two budgets. Then, RemB(v) =
{} ≻ {} ≻ {} ≻ {a}, RemB′(v) = {} ≻ {} ≻ {b} ≻
{}, IndB,B′(v) = {3}, and IndB′,B(v) = {4}. Thus, v
prefers B over B′.
5.2. SBA is Efficient for Quantitative
Proposals
A straightforward adaptation of SBA to quantitative
budget proposals would be to rename the items such that
the quantity of each item would be one, and then to use
the description of SBA from Section 3; this, however,
results in pseudo-polynomial time.
It is possible to slightly modify SBA to run in
polynomial time for quantitative budget proposals. To
explain our modifications to SBA, it is useful to
identify the cause of the computational inefficiency
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of the straightforward adaptation of SBA: The
constructed majority graph would have a vertex for
each single copy of each item, possibly resulting in a
super-polynomial-sized majority graph. To remedy this
inefficiency, it seems natural to construct a majority
graph with one vertex for each item, representing all
copies of that item: The resulting majority graph would
indeed have polynomial number of vertices. However,
we would not be able to represent all majority relations
between the budget items, as such graph would be,
roughly speaking, too “coarse”. To overcome this
difficulty, we will first initiate the majority graph
as described above, followed by splitting its vertices
according to the way the corresponding copies of each
item are split in the vote profile.
Theorem 2. SBA can be adapted to quantitative budget
proposals to run in polynomial time.
Proof. We describe a modification to SBA, denoted by
ESBA, which differs from SBA in the way it constructs
the majority graph. Specifically, first construct a
majority graph G having a vertex (b, q) for each
tuple (b, q) in the quantitative budget proposal. Then,
iteratively process each tuple (b, q) in the quantitative
budget proposal, initially corresponding to a vertex
(b, q) in G, as follows. For each vote v : C1 ≻ . . . ≻
Cz , represented over the quantitative representation
of budget proposals, and where b appears in the
components C = {Ci1 , Ci2 , . . . , Cit} (ij ∈ [z],
j ∈ [t]) with corresponding quantities qi1 , qi2 , . . . , qit ,
such that (b, qij ) ∈ Cij (ij ∈ [z], j ∈ [t]),
notice that
∑
j∈[t] qij = q, and create the following
sequence of numbers, denoted by splitv(b): [qi1 , qi1 +
qi2 , . . . ,
∑
j∈[t] qij ]. Intuitively, splitv(b) collects v’s
splitting points of b. E.g., consider a vote v :
(a, 2) ≻ (b, 2) ≻ (a, 1): Notice that v splits the 3
occurrences of a into two components, where in the
first component v has two of its occurrences while in
the second component v has the third occurrence of b.
Correspondingly, splitv3(a) = [2, 3].
After computing splitv(b) for each vote v, merge
those sequences into a single sequence denoted by
split(b); that is, split(b) = ∪v∈Vsplitv(b), where
V is the given vote profile. Intuitively, split(b)
collects the splitting points of b across all voters.
Recall that currently the majority graph has one vertex
(b, q) corresponding to the budget item b; first, we
delete (b, q) from the majority graph. Then, denote
split(b) = [q1, . . . , qx] and create the following x
vertices {(b, [1, q1]), (b, [q1 + 1, q2]), . . . , (b, [qx−1 +
1, qx])}. Intuitively, a vertex (b, [l, r]) stands for the lth,
(l + 1)th, . . ., (r − 1)th, and rth occurrence of b.
The above process is done for each tuple (b, q)
in the quantitative budget proposal. Importantly, the
number of vertices in the resulting majority graph is
polynomially bounded by the input, as any splitting
point in split(b), and thus each vertex in the majority
graph, can be charged to at least one vote, and each
vote can be responsible only for polynomially-many
vertices. Furthermore, the constructed majority graph
can represent all majority relations, as no vote splits a
budget item b “finer” than split(b).
6. Hierarchical Budgeting
Budgets of complex organizations and societies are
constructed hierarchically; here we use our approach,
specifically the fact that SBA works in two independent
phases, to achieve that.
Hierarchical budgets are constructed in two phases.
First, each section of the organization performs an
independent budgeting process that decides upon the
priorities within the section, but without a given
budget limit. Then, a consolidating budgeting process
determines the allocation of funds to the different
sections by providing each with a section budget
limit, the sum of which is the consolidated budget
limit. Each section’s ordered partition is pruned by
its section budget limit. The resulting section budgets
are combined into a consolidated feasible budget. E.g.,
consider a government with several ministries: each
ministry conducts its own budgeting process and then
the government conducts its overall budgeting process
by allocating resources to each of the ministries.
An important feature of our algorithm is that it
does not require fixing an a priori section budget
limits, as the ranking procedure does not depend on the
limit. This flexibility turns out to be crucial for the
algorithmic construction of hierarchical budgets. It also
has important practical implications: The allocation of
section budget limits need not be done a priory, but can
use the ranking of the section to take into account and
deliberate the implications of different section budget
limits on the budgeting of various items. So while the
government might not intervene in the ranking of the
section (perhaps respecting the subsidiary principle), it
has some control of what will be funded and what will
not by choosing a specific section budget limit.
Our hierarchical budgeting method can be applied
in two scenarios: One, where each section budget
is created by votes of experts/stakeholders, and then
the consolidated budget is created by the votes of the
sovereign body. Another, when the same body decides
on both section budgets and the consolidated budget.
This method helps the sovereign body to focus in
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turn on each section budget independently, and then to
consolidate the results.
Our next description has only two levels of hierarchy,
however the process naturally generalizes to further
levels. Given n sections, we begin by creating n budget
proposals Pi, i ∈ [n], one for each section. Then,
the voters of each section vote independently on each
section proposal. We separately apply only the ranking
procedure to the votes of each section to produce the
section rankings Vi, i ∈ [n]. We arbitrarily linearize the
unary rankings; denote the resulting sequences V Li , i ∈
[n] and define V Li [k] to be the set of the first k items
of V Li . We then define n “artificial” derived budget
items si, i ∈ [n], one for each section, and associated
cost functions Fi(n) = cost(V
L
i [n] − cost(V
L
i [n −
1]). The consolidated budget proposal is then P =⋃
i∈[n](si, ni), where ni is the number of of items
in V Li . Then, each vote on the consolidated budget
proposal is a ranking of the consolidated proposal P ,
which consists of only si’s. (Practically, however, when
a voter chooses, say, to rank first six s3’s, this would be
after the voter has looked “under the hood” and knows
what are the first six items of the budget of the s3
section.) Given a budget limit ℓ on the consolidated
budget, all votes on the consolidated budget proposal
P are then treated as usual: We apply the ranking
procedure and then the pruning procedure with the
limit ℓ, and produce a high-level budget.
With respect to the allocation between sections, the
properties of this consolidated budget are the same as
the properties of the non-hierarchical budgets produced
by our algorithm. Votes on the consolidated proposal
can prioritize items among the different sections, and
know what are they prioritizing, but cannot affect,
at the consolidation stage, the relative priority of the
underlying “true” items within each section.
To compare constructing a budget to constructing
it hierarchically, we assume that the voters have
preferences over all items, of all sections, and that, to
ease the budgeting process, they decide to construct it
hierarchically. Then, we compare the two options: (1)
Using SBA directly on the preferences of the voters;
and (2) Using SBA hierarchically, first on each section
independently, and then consolidating the budget at a
high level, over the sections, as described above. The
resulting budget might be different.
Example 8. Consider two sections, Section A,
containing items a1 and a2, and Section B, containing
item b. Let all items cost 1, and set the budget limit to 2.
Assume the following voters with preferences over all
items of all sections together: v1 : a1 ≻ a2 ≻ b, v2 :
a1 ≻ b ≻ a2, v3 : a2 ≻ b ≻ a1. The budget {a1, a2}
is a Condorcet-winning budget (notice that both v1 and
v2 prefer it to {a2, b} while both v1 and v3 prefer
it to {a1, b}); thus, using SBA directly, disregarding
hierarchy, would result in {a1, a2} being the winning
budget, while using SBA hierarchically would result in
a different winning budget: Using the ranking phase
of SBA on Section A would give the ordered partition
a1 ≻ a2, and using the ranking phase of SBA on
Section B would give the ordered partition b. Then,
considering those ordered partitions and employing SBA
in the high-level, would result in the budget {a1, b}.
There are certain cases in which using SBA directly
(disregarding hierarchy) and using it hierarchically is
guaranteed to give the same results. One simple,
extreme such case is where all voters agree unanimously
on the order of the low-level section items of all sections.
7. Discussion
We identified certain aspects, generally disregarded
in the growing literature on PB, which are nevertheless
useful in employing such methods to produce budgets in
a democratic way. Accordingly, we provided a formal
treatment of a general setting of democratic budgeting
which (a) Takes into account the previous (last year’s)
budget; (b) Allows voters to specify partial orders or
special cases of such; (c) Incorporates quantitative,
indivisible items of arbitrary costs, capturing, e.g., items
with decreasing marginal costs; and (d) Allows for
hierarchical construction of budgets. We generalized
the Condorcet criterion to democratic budgeting
and described a polynomial-time Condorcet-consistent
participatory budgeting. Our algorithm is designed
in such a way that it supports hierarchical budget
construction, making it applicable to entire, high-stakes
budgets. Next, we discuss avenues for further research.
Complementarities. Our elicitation method allows
for quite complex user preferences, but does not
incorporate complementarities between budget items.
Such inter-relations between budget items have not been
considered in the literature on PB. Having efficient ways
for users to express such, while avoiding exponential
blow-up, is an interesting future research direction.
More Axiomatic Considerations. Here we
concentrated on Condorcet-consistency. This makes
our methods suitable for situations where majority
decisions are morally justified and not to situations
where proportionality is desired (where one can
use, e.g., the methods of Aziz et al. [6]; notice
that usually majoritarianism and proportionality are
somewhat mutually exclusive). On a different note,
one might consider other axiomatic properties, such as
monotonicity.
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Aspects of Democratic Budgets. One might
consider other methods of democratic budgeting, e.g.,
investigating how to generalize existing methods of
participatory budgeting to be applied to the more general
setting of democratic budgeting.
Breaking Ties. SBA picks a maximal subset of
each Schwartz set which is the closest to the previous
budget. We suggest further to (1) Sort items by
cost, favoring cheaper items, resulting in budgets with
more items; and (2) Sort items by indices, favoring
an item which was never budgeted to another item
of a type which was already budgeted several times,
resulting in more diverse budgets. One might also
aim at solving the underlying Knapsack problem, by
computing (e.g., using dynamic programming) the
maximum-sized subset of each Schwartz set.
User Interface Considerations. For deployment,
and if a vote is a weak order, a convenient UI is needed
to specify it. Two simple user interfaces are a sequence
of pairs (item, quantity) and a pie chart. We interpret
the former as an ordered partition where each partition
consists of one pair. A pie chart might be interpreted as
one component with multiple pairs, but we propose to
interpret it differently, as follows: If not all items can
be funded, then items should be funded proportionally
according to the cost ratios specified by the chart. As
our budgeting model refers to discrete items, each with
a specific cost, such proportional allocation can only
be approximated. To exploit the full power of ordered
partitions, a user interface should cater for a sequence
of pie charts. Furthermore, the user interface may
directly incorporate the previous budget, viewed as a
dichotomous ordered partition, and allow voters to move
items from the two indifference classes, and also to
provide for the possibility of refining them to more
classes.
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